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In the 1970s advances in genetics raised the possibility of adding recombinant DNA (or “gene splicing”)
techniques to the array of methods used by breeders to develop new varieties of plants. Recombinant
DNA technology involves isolating the fragments of DNA expressing the genes that carry a desired
characteristic in one plant or variety of plant, splitting the DNA molecule of another variety or plant with
other desired characteristics, combining the two partial DNA molecules into a single new DNA molecule,
and then inserting that new DNA molecule into a cell and providing appropriate conditions in a lab that will
enable that new recombinant DNA (rDNA) molecule to replicate. If replication is successful, the cells with
the rDNA can then be used to grow a new variety of plant with tissue culture methods identical to those
used by traditional hybridizers. Though the goal, development of hybrid plants or animals combining the
desirable characteristics of two or more “parent” varieties, is similar to that of traditional cross-breeding
through grafting of plants or artificial insemination of animals, the process was unproven. In addition, some
of the prospects described by gene splicing enthusiasts inspired fears among other observers that
recombinant DNA techniques could result in the breeding of very pernicious varieties. While traditional
hybridizing and artificial insemination techniques can be applied only to plants or animals that will crossbreed as whole organisms, recombinant DNA techniques can by-pass that limit, and observers who believe
the natural barriers to cross-breeding are part of nature’s defense against evolution of dangerous varieties
looked with dismay at the prospect of jumping over that barrier.
General Considerations informing Policy Decisions
Policy decisions in scientific and engineering fields have a factual and a normative component. The factual
component consists of the scientific or technical knowledge needed to make an effective decision; the
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normative component consists of the principles and values and principles that policy-makers or citizens
believe will guide them to a good decision. The intensity of policy debate about a particular matter is
related to both the level of uncertainty in scientific or technical knowledge about the matter and the level of
ethical concern. The possible variation in intensity can be suggested by a nine-cell matrix:

level of ethical
concern

level of knowledge uncertainty
high
high
medium
low

medium

low

Knowledge uncertainty can take any of several forms; each of them makes choosing policies difficult
because uncertainty reduces ability to foresee the full consequences of any policy choice. The first, and
most fundamental, form of uncertainty is lack of knowledge regarding the basic cause-effect relationships
among physical phenomena. When causal knowledge is missing, people cannot anticipate how changing
some aspect of a physical situation (for example, releasing chlorofluorocarbons [CFCs] into the
atmosphere) will affect other aspects (the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the thickness of any
particular layer of the atmosphere). When CFCs were first invented, they were regarded as
environmentally superior to earlier refrigerants because the earlier ones sometimes exploded while CFCs
are inert at ground level. Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the connection between CFC
emissions and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer understood. A milder form of uncertainty, also
inhibiting good policy choices, exists when the basic causal relations are understood but the intensity of the
relation between cause and effect cannot be estimated very precisely. In the 1970s and 1980s many
people agreed that carbon dioxide and other gaseous emissions were altering the chemical composition of
the atmosphere, but there was still considerable disagreement among experts about what amount of
change in average temperature of the atmosphere would affect weather patterns around the world. A third
form of uncertainty exists when both the basic causal mechanism and the intensity of cause-effect relation
are understood but it is not clear how to ensure desirable changes or prevent undesirable ones. In the late
1960s, many people thought that banning use of CFCs as aerosol propellant (as in deodorants or spray
paint) would prevent further damage to the stratospheric ozone layer; only in the mid 1970s was it fully
understood that refrigeration uses would have to be ended as well because the small amounts of CFCs
escaping from each refrigerator added up globally to significant emissions.
Ethical concern can focus on people or on nature. Traditionally, ethics focused on the impact of one
person’s actions on other persons, with ethicists, philosophers, and others debating questions like avoiding
harm to others, ensuring fairness or justice, and how far one person may enjoy freedom from limits on
choice or action. Since the late 1960s increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of human
activity on nature, and considerable ethical discussion of humans’ obligations to future generations of
humans (intergenerational equity), to other species of life (animal welfare or animal rights) or to nature as a
whole (ecological sustainability, humans as a part of a larger web of life). At any particular time, the level of
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ethical concern surrounding an issue rests on a combination of its perceived importance to the well-being of
humans and/or nature and on the level of consensus regarding the values that should guide policy choices
and human actions on the matter.
Scientific uncertainty and ethical concern converge in the process of defining what action is “safe.” Even
when the risk (the likelihood that a negative impact of a particular magnitude will occur) can be specified
fairly clearly, different individuals, groups, and societies may react differently, one deciding the risk is
tolerable and hence that undertaking the activity is safe (at least as long as those doing so are reasonably
prudent), and another deciding that the risk is too high and hence undertaking the activity is not safe.
When lack of knowledge of the likelihood and intensity of some impact is great enough that people can
insist that the probability of harm is high and its intensity very strong, there will be particularly strong
pressures to define the activity as unsafe.
Genetically Modified Organisms
Genetic modification of organisms and plants involves identifying genes that carry desirable traits (such as
pest resistance, disease resistance, or higher nutritional content), developing recombinant DNA (rDNA)
containing the genes carrying the desired trait, and using that rDNA to breed a new variety of the organism
or plant that will have the trait. Genetically modified (“GM”) organisms, plants, animal feeds, and human
foods inspire heated debate today because they involve both high knowledge uncertainty and high ethical
concern. The knowledge uncertainty is focused primarily on the impact of introducing GM organisms,
plants, feeds, or foods into fields and food supplies on humans, other varieties of animal or plant life, and
the natural environment more generally. Perceptions of likely impact range from minimal – GM foods,
though produced by new technology, pose no greater risk to ecosystems and living beings than new
varieties of plants or animals developed with traditional techniques of grafting or selective breeding whole
organisms – to maximal – GM organisms are so different from varieties developed with traditional
techniques that they will unbalance the natural environment. Adding to the confusion, the maximal harm
scenarios come in two varieties. In the first, GM organisms either displace natural varieties or combine with
them to produce destructive organisms (the “frankenfood” scenario) that crowd out others. In the second,
GM organisms and plants prove so genetically identical that they can be eliminated by some disease the
developers did not consider and wide adoption leaves food supplies extremely vulnerable to sudden
collapse (the starvation from loss of genetic diversity scenario).
In recent years, the situation has become more fluid as gene insertion techniques have been applied to
“cisgenic” as well as “transgenic” rDNA. Transgenic rDNA contains genes spliced out from different
species that would not cross-breed naturally with the species being improved, and this feature of crossing
natural barriers to inter-breeding inspired much of the concern about environmental effects of GM
organisms and plants. “Cisgenic” rDNA is developed from organisms or plants closely enough related to
one another that they would cross-breed naturally. Using cisgenic rDNA rather than traditional crossbreeding of whole organisms allows developers to select only the gene carrying a desired trait, whereas
traditional cross-breeding involves taking up the entire gene sequence. Thus, for example, a conventional
breeder seeking to improve resistance of potatoes to Phytophthora infestans (which causes potato blight)
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use wild varieties that also carry genes that express toxic compounds like glyco-alkaloids. The undesired
trait must then be removed by a process of back-crossing over several generations until a hybrid is
developed that has the desired trait (disease-resistance) without the undesired one (glycol-alkaloids). Back
crossing can be a lengthy process, whereas cisgenic rDNA produces a desired variety in a single
generation.
High ethical concern about GM organisms has two sources: concerns for the integrity and sustainability of
the natural environment and concern about the social consequences of allowing the supply of seeds or
breeding stock to be controlled by developers (mainly thought not exclusively very large multinational
corporations) having 20-year monopolies over distribution of any particular genetic material, seed, or
animal breeding stock as a consequence of patent rights.
Sources of EU-US Divergence
In debates over GM organisms, scientific uncertainty and ethical concern have played out differently in the
European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) since the mid 1990s for institutional and
ideational reasons. The US regulatory system is centralized for rule-making, with regulatory authority held
by three government agencies – the Food and Drug Administration (food safety), the Department of
Agriculture (planting of GM crops), and the Environmental Protection Agency (use of GM technology to
create pest resistance in plants) but decentralized for rule-enforcement in that individuals, groups, firms or
large sets of individuals can bring a tort suit against a developer or seller of GM seeds or plants or products
made from GM plants and US law allows assessing of high financial penalties for damage. The EU
regulatory system is decentralized in rule-making, with the EU Commission and EU agencies co-existing
with national agencies but more centralized in rule-enforcement because the civil law systems of
continental European states do not make provision for private tort suits.1 While in some areas the US
federal government and the governments of the 50 states of the union contend over their spheres of
authority, federal authority to regulate the development and use of GM technology clearly prevails. In the
EU, ongoing struggles for authority between the EU Commission (the supranational body in charge of
developing draft regulations) and the EU Council and European Parliament (the representative bodies of
member governments and of national populations respectively with the power to adopt regulations) as well
as between EU agencies and national government agencies creates more veto points in the decisionmaking processes regarding GM technology than exist in the USA because neither Congress not the courts
have been involved in any sustained way with debates about use of GM technology.
These institutional differences have less practical impact when EU and US approaches to regulation are
less divergent; the two have been able to develop common regulations on a wide range of technical,

Legal differences noted in Mark A. Pollock and Gregory C. Schaffer. 2009. When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and
Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 53. As they point out, “This difference in the
operation of US and European legal systems is often forgotten in political and sociological assessments of their different
approaches to the risks posed by genetically engineered varieties.”
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economic, and health matters.2 However, in the mid 1990s European attitudes toward GM foods, animal
feeds, and crops diverged significantly from US attitudes. The Reagan Administration set the basic
parameters of US policy in 1986 in laying out the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of
Biotechnology. This encouraged the approach formalized in 1992 under which the US agencies treated
genetic modification as another form of breeding and focused on whether a particular product of GM
technology is safe. Partly because of pressures from conservatives and business interests, US regulatory
approaches rely heavily quantifiable estimates of potential harms and benefits used to make cost-benefit
analyses. Though initially inclined to treat GM organisms as similar, the EU and most of its member states
now regard genetically modified organisms, plants, feeds, and foods as very different from “conventional”
varieties developed with traditional cross-breeding and hybridization techniques because GM technology
allows combining genes across species of plants or animals. This focus on the technology as
fundamentally different encourages rejection of cost-benefit analysis in favor of regarding the area as one
so full of uncertainty that the EU’s preference for relying on the precautionary principle in matters having
environmental implications should apply. This principle mandates avoiding a new activity or technology
while its long-term consequences remain unknown, and taking it up only after the best available
assessment techniques show that there will be only low and reversible negative impact on the environment
and particular life forms. Thus US regulatory agencies regard genetically modified organisms, plants,
feeds, and foods as “substantially equivalent” to varieties produced by traditional breeding methods unless
there is solid proof of a significant difference while European ones assume there is a substantial difference.
Nor does the USA rely as extensively on the precautionary principle; most of its policy decisions are still
guided by the traditional rule that a new activity may proceed until it is shown to cause significant harm.
These differing presuppositions result in very deep differences of regulatory approach on the two sides of
the Atlantic. The basic US government decision that GM plants, animal feeds, and human foods are
essentially similar to conventionally-bred plants, feeds, and foods requires regulators to demonstrate that
they are notably less safe for planting or consumption before they can block cultivation or sale. In the EU,
a largely opposite dynamic has prevailed since late 1998. European rules start from the proposition that
GM plants, feeds, and foods are significantly different from conventionally bred ones and those who want to
plant or sell them must prove to regulatory agencies that their plant, feed, or food is safe. The different
orientations also affect policies towards GM organisms already in the environment: the EU requires more
continued monitoring of effects than does the USA.
Origins of the Divergence
In the late 1980s, before the regulatory differences developed, business leaders and policy-makers in the
EU and the USA agreed that coordinating their policy approaches in a range regulatory policy areas would
be helpful to both industry and consumers. In 1995 European and American business leaders created the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) to push for the liberalization and harmonization of laws and
2See,

for examples, George Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter Lindstreth, eds. 2001 Transatlantic Regulatory
Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A.
Pollack, eds. 2003. Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The US, the EU, and the WTO (New York: Oxford University Press);
David Andrews, Mark A. Pollack, Gregory Schaffer, and Helen Wallace, eds. 2005. The Future of Transatlantic Economic
Relations: Continuity amidst Discord (Florence: Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute).
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regulations regarding highly-traded goods and services on both continents. From its beginnings the TABD
urged the United States and the European Union to adhere to a shared policy on genetically modified food.
Its recommendations were forwarded to the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), an EU-US
governmental working group charged with developing draft common policies. In 1998 the TEP created a
Biotechnology Working Group that attempted to launch a project that would have created a process for
simultaneous regulation of particular GMOs on both sides of the Atlantic.
The original EU rules adopted in Directive 90/220 of 1990 were very similar to the US rules, so prospects
for agreeing on a common set of rules and a parallel regulatory process looked very good. Before the
TEP’s project got underway, however, the prospects for success were undermined by food safety scares
and the rise of anti-genetically modified food protests in Europe that sent the EU policy process in a
different direction. Though relating to conventionally bred plants and animals, the scare about humans
contracting bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) from English beef in 1996 and
the discoveries of toxic materials in Belgian and French animal feedstocks in 1999,3 reduced public
confidence in EU and national regulators just as anti-GMO campaigns were taking off. US biotech firms
were aware of the sentiments, and Monsanto sought in vain to counter them with public relations
campaigns that, by suggesting critics were irrational and anti-science, only strengthened opposition by
allowing environmental groups to present the GM controversy as one of embattled civil society groups up
against, but ultimately overcoming, large foreign multinational corporations. All agricultural applications of
GM technology were cast into doubt as environmentalists deployed a combination of worst-case scenarios
about environmental damage, fears about eating foods containing ingredients with unknown health
consequences, and arguments that GM technology benefits mainly those engaged in large-scale
environmentally-damaging “industrial” farming so hurts poorer farmers to raise very effective technical and
ethical concerns.
The government of Austria led the way to policy divergence in February 1997 by invoking the 1990
Directive’s Article 16 “safeguard clause” that allowed member states to ban growing plants from particular
GM seeds if they judge that growing them will threaten the country’s environment even if EU regulatory
authorities have accepted them as safe. Austria’s decision to ban BT 176 maize (corn) developed by
Novartis, inspired other governments to take similar decisions; between 1997 and 2000, six-member
countries – Austria, Luxembourg, France, Greece, Italy, and Germany – had invoked the safeguard clause
on 12 occasions to ban particular plants. Opponents of using GM technology claimed that Directive 90/220
was too vague and the approval process lacked sufficiently stringent risk assessment requirements, and
their positions garnered substantial public support. In 1998-99 some major European food processors –
Danone, Nestle, and Unilever – and some supermarket chains – including Sainsbury’s in the UK and
Carrefour in France – announced they would not use or sell products containing GM ingredients.
Responding to the general public discontent, and hoping to ward off further member government use of
safeguards, the European Commission announced on 26 November 1997 that it would amend Directive
90/220 to address the concerns of its member states and issue no further approvals of GM plants or
products until the new regulations were in place. This course of action was reaffirmed in June 1999 when
the EU Council outlined its thinking on a new, more restrictive regulatory scheme including tougher safety
3Pollack
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criteria and requiring authorizations to plant or sell be renewed every 10 years. Previously issued permits
remained valid, but strong consumer resistance meant that sales of GM seeds and GM-containing feeds
and foods fell drastically. The value of American GM corn exports to EU countries fell from around $211
million in 1997 to $200,000 in 2005; similarly, GM soybean exports fell from $2.3 billion in 1997 to $511
million in 2005.
Reinforcement of the Divergence
While developing its regulations, the EU also participated actively in the multilateral negotiations leading to
conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in January 2000. Enough countries then ratified the
Protocol for it to enter into force and provide binding rules for the countries accepting it. The Protocol does
not affect national regulations, though it does reinforce the right of each country to make its own regulations
and ensure that any seeds, plantstocks, or agricultural products imported into its territory meet its
regulatory requirements through what international lawyers call a “prior informed consent regime.” The
Protocol requires exporters of GM organisms to provide information about the organisms they want to send
to other countries and get express approval from the importing country’s government before trade
proceeds. The importing country government can require a risk assessment if none is available, and also
that the exporter absorb the costs of performing the risk assessment. Any agricultural commodities (raw
materials like cotton as well as animal feeds and human foods) that contain GMOs must be accompanied
by documentation indicating the shipment “may contain” GMOs. Governments must also post information
about their regulations, approvals they have granted, and risk assessments they have done or had others
do on a central Internet site maintained by the international Biosafety Clearing-House.4 This helps
governments, importers, and exporters by giving them “one-stop shopping” for the information they need to
operate the prior informed consent regime. The US government has not accepted the Protocol, but the 147
of the world’s 196 independent states that have – which include all members of the EU and major importers
of agricultural products like China, Egypt, India, and Japan, and many African counties importing food or
receiving food aid – can invoke it to require any private company or person seeking to export GMOs to
comply with the rules it establishes. This follows from the traditional international law principle that each
state has control over activity on its territory, and once goods shipped from one country as exports arrive
reach their destination at a port or airport of another, they become imports subject to that state’s control.
Article 1 of the Biosafety Protocol contains a clear endorsement of the precautionary principle:
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level
of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from
modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary
movements.
Article 2, the General Provisions, strongly endorse the right of each country to make its own decisions.

4The
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Paragraph 2 specifies that:
The Parties shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer and release of any
living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that prevents or reduces the risks to
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.
Paragraph 4 says that:
Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the right of a Party to take action that is
more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity than that called for in
this Protocol, provided that such action is consistent with the objective and the provisions of this
Protocol and is in accordance with that Party's other obligations under international law.
All of these provisions reinforce the European stance that GM technology poses significant risks and so are
not to be used before a very thorough prior assessment, and challenge the US stance that GM organisms
are basically safe so may be used unless proven otherwise.5
Though the EU adopted its new regulations in 2001 and 2003, it did not start considering new approvals of
growing GM crops or selling foods or feeds containing GM material because public opposition to GM foods
remained very strong. US firms and food distributors, who believed their products were both safe and
beneficial, were irritated by what they saw as an intentional move to keep the moratorium in place even
though the new policies had been adopted. Many of them also thought the EU was using public opinion as
a smokescreen for policies actually meant to protect European seed companies, farmers, and food
wholesalers from foreign competition. Such suspicion was not entirely unreasonable; the EU has a long
record of maintaining particularly high trade barriers against foreign agricultural and food products. Yet,
even the George W. Bush administration, one well known for its partiality to the interests of big business
and the well-organized agricultural groups, was reluctant to confront the issue head-on until May 2003. By
then, the extent of anti-GMO sentiment among both the US and European public appeared stable and
unlikely to be increase the publicity attending a trade dispute. More important to US decision-makers, third
countries were defining their attitudes towards GMOs, with some becoming highly restrictive, and US
companies and growers’ associations were pressing the government to head that off.6
The WTO Complaint
On 13 May 2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina filed complaints with the World Trade
Organization contending that the European Union – referred to in the complaint as the European
Community – moratorium on approving new genetically modified food amounted to unfair protectionist
measures against their countries’ GM products, actions they contended were prohibited by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7 However, they carefully confined their complaint to procedural
5Cartagena

Protocol on Biosafety. Text available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/protocol.shtml (accessed 17 June 2010).
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issues rather than challenging the EU’s basic regulatory framework or the substance of its regulations. The
complainants’ main arguments were that neither the “de facto general moratorium” on approving any
additional GM plants for growth or sale not the Commission’s failure to approve GM varieties that the
European Food Safety Agency had agreed were safe were based on scientific evidence or an appropriate
risk assessment as required by the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS). While attempts to end the moratorium was arguably the most important single element of
the complaints, the three countries also objected to six EU member states’ – Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg - use of the EU “safeguard clause” to prohibit imports of certain GMOs
and/or maintain product-specific moratoriums.
The EU response emphasized two points. The EU argued, first, that it never adopted a formal moratorium
on the approval of new GM crops, and cited its May 2004 approval of the Bt-11 variety of sweet corn as
evidence that a blanket ban on new GM products never existed, and that each case was decided on its
own merits. Second, the EU also argued that the SPS Agreement did not adequately address the
complexities of the GM food case by itself, so other international agreements, such as the 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity and its 2003 Protocol on Biosafety, that do address those complexities should also
guide interpretation of obligations under GATT. It contended in particular that the 2003 Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety – to which the EU, but not the United States, Canada, or Argentina is a party – permits states
to adopt a precautionary approach toward products created by application of new technologies.
After the required “consultations” between the EU and each of the complaining states failed to resolve the
dispute; the matter went to a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel. While the USA, Canada, and Argentina had
made separate complaints (WT/DS291, WT/DS292, and WT/DS293 respectively) all three were assigned
to one Dispute Settlement Panel because of their similarity. Unlike the previous GATT Dispute Settlement
Process, where the veto-power of individual member states forced panels to reach decisions all member
states would accept, the WTO Dispute Settlement Process requires consensus among all parties for
rejection of a Panel’s report. This rule establishes a presumption in favor of accepting the Panel Report,
effectively transferring decision authority from the Dispute Settlement Body composed or representatives of
the member states to the Dispute Settlement Panels and, if any of the disputants is unhappy enough with
the Panel’s decision to seek a review, to the Appellate Board.
The three-member WTO Panel began hearing oral arguments in June 2004. Five states, Australia, Chile,
China, New Zealand, and Norway, filed memoranda as third parties to the case. Australia and Chile laid
out largely neutral arguments in support of third parties’ and developing countries’ rights to file memoranda
on WTO disputes as third parties. China and Norway filed arguments supporting the EU’s position, while
New Zealand supported the complainants’ position. The Panel also accepted briefs from three
nongovernmental entities that urged it to rule that the EU’s regulations were consistent with trade law, but
the Panel did not mention them or use their arguments in developing its ruling.
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The Dispute Settlement Panel’s September 2006 final report8 ruled that the EU’s pre-market approval
system for GM products violated the SPS Agreement provision prohibiting unnecessary delays. The Panel
concluded that “the European Communities applied a general de facto moratorium on approvals of biotech
products between June 1999 and 29 August 2003” and set a date of 21 November 2007 for the EU to lift its
moratorium on the approval of GM products, or risk facing WTO sanctions. In addition, the Panel
recommended to the Dispute Settlement Body that it request the European Commission to finish the
approval process of GMOs stuck in legal limbo. The Panel requested that the Dispute Settlement Body
require member states with national safeguard measures in place bring their laws into accordance with
WTO regulations. The EU had contended that the GATT and the SPS Agreement, adopted in 1994, should
be read in light of the later Cartagena Protocol and its institutionalization of the precautionary principle used
to interpret what measures are allowed under the SPS Agreement. Argentina, Canada, and the USA
contended that the SPS Agreement should be read on its own terms, not in light of a different agreement.
The Panel avoided the question by declaring neither the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety nor the
Convention on Biological Diversity were pertinent to the dispute before it because some of the countries
involved in the dispute were not parties to those agreements. This is consistent with the international law
rule that states are bound only by rules to which they have given consent, either expressly (as by ratifying a
treaty) or tacitly (as by using the rule to justify their own actions).
While the ruling could be interpreted as a victory for pro-GM interests, the Dispute Settlement Panel did not
state any opinions that would prevent the EU from continuing to develop stricter regulations than prevail in
the USA and other countries. The Panel focused closely on the questions before it, and consistent with
good adjudication practice, did not rule on extraneous questions or make a broad statement when a narrow
one would settle a point in dispute. Thus, the Final Report did not address the legality of the pre-market
approval, and risk assessment procedures ultimately adopted by the EU, and in particular, avoided
specifying whether the precautionary principle is (as the EU contended) or is not (as the complainant
countries contended) a part of international law binding on all states. Though concluding the EU’s use of
this particular moratorium violated GATT rules, it did not address the legality of future product-specific
measures the European Union or any other country might adopt in the future. The Panel also avoided
stating any conclusions on the question of whether GM foods are substantially similar to their conventional
counterparts, the position of many in the USA who support less regulation. Thus the WTO ruling went
against the European Union on the technicalities of its de facto moratorium, but did not include any ruling
that would force the EU into a complete revision of the EU regulatory system, though it did indicate that EU
member states’ maintenance of national bans on GM products the relevant EU institutions had accepted as
safe were contrary to the SPS agreement.
Consistent with WTO rules, the parties then agreed that the EU should be given a 12-month “Reasonable
Time Period” to come into compliance, after which complainants could seek permission to apply retaliatory
measures if the EU were not making progress in bringing its policies into line with the Panel Ruling. They
then agreed to extend this another year, until January 2008.

8European

Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. WTO Document WT/DS291R
(29 September 2006). Commonly known as the EC-Biotech dispute.
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Future Prospects
The EU and the US are unlikely to adopt similar regulations regarding cultivation of GM plant varieties or
sale of products containing GM ingredients because public opinion remains more strongly opposed to
applications of GM technology for several reasons:
1. US firms developing or hoping to develop agricultural applications of GM technologies formed an
effective nationwide industry lobby despite differences in firm size and main areas of interest early
in the discussions of GMOs. European firms developing or hoping to develop agricultural
applications of GM technology failed to form industry lobbies, particularly at the EU-wide level,
early in the process and their efforts still lag behind those of US firms. Thus the European GM
debate includes fewer advocates of agricultural applications than the US debate.
2. Most GM plant varieties developed so far bred for disease resistance, herbicidal properties, or
pesticidal properties, and these traits are most useful to farmers engaged in highly mechanized
cultivation on large fields. There are more such farmers in the USA than in EU countries.
3. European food sellers typically purchase much of their food from local or regional suppliers rather
than large transcontinental suppliers. In the USA most supermarket chains rely on large
transcontinental suppliers. Genetic modifications that increase the keeping time or shipping
hardiness of vegetables, fruit, and other foods are less important to European than to US food
suppliers.
4. On average, European consumers place higher value on freshness and local varieties of food than
do US consumers. GM organisms and plants are perceived by European consumers as highly
standardized “industrial-style” products lacking character. There is a growing “buy local”
movement in the USA but it still accounts for only a small part of US food consumption.
5. Though US regulatory processes in place during the 1980s actually included more opportunity for
public comment than did the EU or member state processes of the time, the initial decision that GM
organisms and plants are “substantially similar” to conventionally-bred organisms and plants meant
that regulatory agencies did not see the need to develop new rules for making decisions about GM
organisms. Thus neither Congressional debates nor the public comment process involved in
agency rule-making occurred at an early stage of technology use. Because of the economic and
consumer attitudes differences noted above, agricultural use of GM technology was far less
widespread in Europe when opposition arose, so it was easier to interrupt approvals and press for
adoption of more restrictive rules.
6. Multiparty political systems, which exist in most EU member states, make it easier for new groups,
such as environmentalists, to form political parties and win seats in the national legislature than do
two-party systems, as exist in the USA and the UK. The ability of small parties to win seats is
increased in countries that use a proportional representation system. In such systems members of
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the legislature are elected from larger multi-member districts and each party wins seats in
proportion to its share of the vote in the district. It is easier to “break in” under this system than
under a single-member district system. Most European countries have multiparty and proportional
representation systems, which encourage European environmentalists to put a lot of energy into
mobilizing ordinary voters. A two-party system, single-member districts, and greater opportunities
for influencing policy through lobbying and litigation in the courts encouraged US environmentalist
groups to put most of their effort into lobbying and litigation. This difference contributes to the
higher level of environmental consciousness among the average European votes than the average
US voter.
7. Similar ethical sentiments prevail among proponents and opponents of agricultural applications of
GM technology on both sides of the Atlantic. Anti-GMO views get more traction on food issues in
Europe because the greater public interest in food quality among Europeans promoted greater
receptivity to arguments that GM technology modifies foods much more than traditional crossbreeding and hybridization techniques.
Differences in the way regulation proceeds in the USA and the EU also affect the results. Even if the two
sets of regulators converged on a single method of risk analysis, which itself seems difficult given greater
US reliance on cost-benefit modes of risk analysis and greater European reliance on the precautionary
principle, the ways each implements regulations inhibits common approaches to risk management through
regulations. The parallel existence of regulatory statutes and the US tort law system as well as strongly
market-oriented economic beliefs encourage regulators to presume things are safe until lack of safety is
demonstrated. The more hierarchical traditions of regulation in Europe combined with the relative absence
of private rights to pursue matters through the courts mean that regulators are more willing to make
determinations regarding individual products.9
Stalemate in Europe has also been prolonged by the work-in-progress nature of the EU regional integration
project. In contrast to the USA, where federal preeminence in regulation of foods, drugs, and chemicals
(including pesticides) has been established for decades, EU bodies still share authority with member state
agencies on many issues, including food safety, agriculture, and environmental protection. Decisionmaking at the EU level can be slowed by the rules requiring that the Council adopt Directives, Regulations,
and some specific regulatory decisions (including approvals of GM varieties of plants for sale or for
cultivation) by a qualified majority comprising half the total number of member states and about 74% of the
total votes cast under the weighted voting system. This has been the case with GM plant varieties, where
the Commission was unable to get the Council to endorse any proposals to authorize marketing foods
containing or growing crops of GM plant varieties in 2006-2008. Throughout that period anti-GM
sentiments seemed to growing among the member states. In 2006 Hungary banned growing of many
varieties approved by the European Food Safety Agency and inhibited cultivation of the few allowed by
requiring that farmers leave 400-meter (1200 feet) wide isolation zones between fields planted with GM
Pollack and Schaffer 2009, p. 53 emphasize the tort liability implications – that FDA statements products are “safe” rather than
“generally recognized as safe” would give their makers strong protection against liability suits.
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varieties and fields planted with conventionally-bred varieties get all neighbors’ written consent before
starting cultivation of GM varieties. Poland banned sale or cultivation of all GM varieties in October 2006, a
measure the EU Commission formally opposed by suing Poland for non-compliance with EU directives in
the European Court of Justice.10 The governments of Ireland and France also joined the government of
Austria in strong opposition to allowing cultivation of GM crops and sale of GM-based products.11
Meanwhile, the WTO Panel Report inspired additional interaction between the parties. Argentina and
Canada let the November 2007 deadline for the EU to comply with the Dispute Settlement Panel’s ruling
pass without seeking permission to retaliate. The USA did ask for authorization to retaliate, the EU filed an
objection, and the two moved into “technical discussions” after starting and then agreeing to a suspension
of the WTO process for determining whether EU inaction merits retaliatory trade measures.12 Canada
formally resolved its complaint in an agreement to hold twice-yearly policy consultations with the EU in July
2009, and Argentina came to a similar agreement in March 2010.13 While clearly disappointed with
continuing EU stalemate, the complainants understand the contentiousness of the issue and the hazards of
pressing too hard.
Signs that the stalemate might be ending appeared in early 2010. In March, after more than three years of
debate triggered by strong opposition from anti-GMO groups, the Commission approved cultivation of
Amflora, a starch-rich potato variety developed by the German firm BASF intended for paper manufacturing
and other industrial uses. This opened the way for cultivation in Germany, Sweden, and the Czech
Republic, and was seen as a significant policy development. In June news reports indicated the
Commission was circulating drafts of a possible new regulation that would allow member states to ban sale
of products containing any GM ingredient or cultivation of any GM variety they desire, rather than be
confined to the human health, animal health, or environmental risk considerations specified in Directive
1830, in return for not blocking EU-level approval of varieties determined to be safe by the European Food
Safety Agency.14 In essence, members of the EU would “agree to disagree” on the issue. Biotechnology
companies and farmers desiring to grow GM varieties would be able to do so under fairly strict rules
regarding separation of GM from non-GM crops both in the field and in the food distribution chain if the
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Pollack and Schaffer 2009, 247.
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“Environment Council: Ministers seek to solve impasse over GMOs.” 2009. European Report 9 June 2009.

12See Europa Press Releases. 2009. EU and Canada settle WTO case on genetically modified organisms.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1142&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
As of May 2010 the EU and the USA had not reached a formal agreement on the dispute. See EU status notification to the WTO
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146140.pdf (accessed 17 June 2010).
13Europa

Press Releases. 2009. EU and Canada settle WTO case on genetically modified organisms.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1142&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en;
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14Joshua
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government of their country agreed. Opponents of GM foods and crops would have to continue supporting
bans where they existed and campaign country-by-country to secure additional bans.
While the regulatory controversies between the US and the EU and within the EU continued, developers
and growers of GM plants and food processors using GM-based ingredients both accommodated to and
created pressures for reduction of the regulatory differences. US government agencies have explicitly
decided against adopting labeling requirements, two methods of distinguishing foods from non-GMO
sources have developed in the USA to appeal to consumers who want to avoid GMOs: a) foods labeled as
“not containing” a GMO or meat and animal products as coming from animals “not treated with” a GM
hormone and b) foods labeled “organic” because the USDA standards for using the organic label adopted
in 2001 exclude use of GM plants, enzymes, or hormones. Export-oriented grain growers’ associations
became more sensitive to problems that would arise if they continued to grow varieties allowed in the US
but not in other countries in summer 2006 when trace amounts of LL601 rice developed by Bayer were
found in shipments of Clearfield rice shipped abroad and both EU and Japanese authorities required all US
rice shipments to be tested and certified to be LL601-free before they could be sold in their markets.
Difficulties for exporters to Europe were compounded in April 2007. EU Directive 1830 specified limits on
trace amounts of GM-derived ingredients in foods labeled “GMO-free.” They could contain no more than
0.9% of an ingredient derived from a GM product authorized for sale in the EU, and no more than 0.5% of
an ingredient derived from a GM variety certified as safe by the EFSA but not yet approved for sale by the
EU Commission for period of three years after the EFSA action. After three years a zero threshold applied
to such ingredients. The zero threshold went into effect on several GM varieties in April 2007, inspiring
considerable complaint from the US and other exporters to the EU because of the extreme difficulty of
separating out different varieties of grain in bulk shipment and the continuing stalemate on approval of GM
varieties in the EU Council.
These and other difficulties that arose when the US permitted cultivation before regulators in importing
countries authorized sale of that same variety inspired the US Biotechnology Industry Organization to adopt
self-regulation under which member firms will not commercialize a new GM variety until it is clear the
variety will be approved for sale in key importing countries.15 Biotechnology companies have also altered
their development plans in response to consumer preferences. Several efforts to commercialize varieties
of rice and wheat initially intended for human consumption have been abandoned. More effort has been
devoted to plants used as animal feed or industrial crops (those used in manufacturing or for fuel). As
Brian Hindo noted in June 2008 that:
The political battles over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through the 1990s left the
company bruised, profitless, and with scaled-back ambitions on the consumer food front. Out were
promises of GMO wheat, rice, and tomatoes. In was a focus on corn, soy, and cotton – big-volume
crops destined for industrial uses such as animal feed, ethanol, and textiles. The gambit worked.

15Biotechnology Industry Organization. 2007. Project Launch Stewardship Policy available at
www.bio.org/foodag/stewardship/20070521.asp (accessed 16 June 2010).
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Since 2003, Monsanto has transformed itself from a money-losing pariah into a $5 billion
agribusiness titan with 20% profit margins and a stock price that is up 1,200%.16
Promoters of cisgenic methods argue that cisgenic rDNA is far safer because it only uses genetic material
that is already present in other varieties of the same plant or organism so would not produce strange
unknown plants if varieties with RDNA were to mix in fields with natural or traditionally-bred varieties.
Therefore, they argue, regulators do not need to subject it to the restrictive conditions applied to varieties
developed with transgenic rDNA. Reducing the regulatory burden, in particular the requirements for
lengthy field tests, isolation of fields used for GM crops from others, and traceability requirements would
permit public institutions and smaller enterprises to apply the technology. This would, in their view, now
only break the oligopoly of large firms that dominate the market for transgenic varieties, but also permit
development of greater genetic variety in crops because the smaller firms would not need to focus on largevolume standardization of seeds as has prevailed in the transgenic field.17 However, others contest claims
that cisgenic methods are safer, and insist that cisgenic varieties should be regulated with the same
strictness as transgenic ones.18
These pragmatic adjustments have not stilled the ethical arguments. However, there are inconsistencies of
attitude on each side that leave regulators and others wondering whether policies regarding GM products
and crops are based on safety concerns, ethical concerns, or economic calculations. When conservatives
in the USA use calls for “sound science” as battering rams to dismantle government regulations, Europeans
begin to doubt that the US government and US interest groups are really serious about science-based
policy assessment. Those suspicions were fuelled by the US Bioterrorism Act of 2002, which included
some trade restrictions lacking scientific rationale.19 Conversely, Americans who follow GM developments
closely know that European firms are the largest producers of GM enzymes in the world, many of which are
used in production of cheese, beer, and other food products in European countries without controversy or
special labeling. They also struggle to understand why Europeans think GM technology is so bad when
they accept radioactive irradiation as a method of altering genetic material for plant breeding purposes.20
The passage of time has brought some lessening of uncertainty about the characteristics of GM organisms.
Some have now been grown for 20 years or more without becoming “frankenfoods” or posing serious harm
to their animal or human eaters. Many government regulators are converging on a more nuanced
16
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approach based on understanding that the environmental impacts of GM crops depend on the traits being
developed and the particular ecosystems into which they will be introduced. In this view neither blanket
opposition to GM technology nor blanket approval is an appropriate attitude; GM organisms must be
considered case-by-case. As uncertainty about effects declines with experience, the warrant for citing
uncertainty about its effects as reason to ban GM technology weakens, particularly in the eyes of actors
who see successful activity elsewhere and would like to engage in it at home. However, some hold out. In
April 2007 EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas maintained that GMO products "raise a whole
new series of possible risks to the environment, notably potential longer-term effects that could impact on
biodiversity. Protected sites or areas, endangered or vulnerable species of plants and animals are of
paramount importance in this respect." He dismissed Food Safety Agency (EFSA) assessments because
"scientific opinions rendered by EFSA have relied exclusively on information provided by companies that
look at short-term effects," meaning "EFSA cannot give a sound scientific opinion on long-term effects of
GMOs."21
Since plants have been subject to human modification for millennia, the ethical arguments for opposing GM
technology as interferences with nature or the divine order are far weaker and have less support than
similar arguments against application of GM technology to animal or human genetic material – as
suggested by the lack of a “plant rights” movement paralleling the animal rights movement. Opponents of
GM as a method of plant breeding continue to maintain their other objections – the uncertainty surrounding
long term effects, and the ethical objections that GM technology facilitates domination of food supplies by a
small group of private companies, that it worsens gaps between wealthier and poorer farmers, and that it
contributes to the further impoverishment of developing countries. The Austrian government added a new
ethical claim to the European mix in April 2007 by arguing that EU rules helping consumers maintain
freedom of choice by requiring GMO-containing products be labeled, should have an analog protecting a
farmer’s right to avoid growing GM plants through regulations assuring good isolation of fields sown with
GM crops.22 In the end, there has been too little ethical consensus to maintain a bright line preventing
every application of genetic modification technology even in the more skeptical Europe.

<end>

21 Quoted in EurActive Network, 2007. “Cracks start to show in EU GMO policy,” EuroActiv.com, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/cap/cracks-start-show-eu-gmo-policy/article-154150 (accessed 16 June 2010).
22

Also noted in EurActiv Network 2007.
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